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Introduction and summary 
On Saturday the 25th of April 2015, Nepal was hit by a massive earthquake, measuring 7.8 on 
the Richter scale. This event was followed a mere 17 days later by another major earthquake, 
which came in as 7.3 on the scale. This paper is based on field research in Kathmandu, Nuwakot 
and Rasuwa, four weeks after the second earthquake struck. It is part of the research embedded 
in the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) funded project Smart Disaster 
Governance, conducted by VU University Amsterdam in close collaboration with, among others, 
Cordaid and Oxfam-Novib.1 
In this white paper we give a first impression of the dilemmas and challenges of the 
humanitarian response we faced in Nepal. The focus is on coordination (i.e. the synchronization of 
actions) and cooperation (i.e. the working together) between the various responding organizations 
and governmental bodies. Governing response to a disaster is complex and difficult, since 
professional response organizations are heterogeneous, while at the same time they have to 
coordinate their actions and collaborate with other organizations and local communities.2 The 
response to the Nepal earthquake was no exception. In this paper we try to understand two 
specific dilemmas we encountered in Nepal, and argue that the dilemmas pertain to underlying 
disaster governance challenges. 
The first dilemma involves top-down versus emergent coordination. The humanitarian response 
organizations in Nepal had to find a balance between established coordination mechanisms 
implemented by UNOCHA to support coordination efforts between various NGOs, and local 
emergent response initiatives. The second dilemma involves imposed versus optional cooperation. The 
responding relief organizations were inclined to work with local (governmental) organizations 
and communities, but faced the problem that local government officials and emergent leaders 
were stretched beyond the limits of their capacity to respond to the crisis. Besides, their political 
agendas further challenged cooperation. 
These dilemmas triggered two important disaster governance issues: 1) seeking a balance 
between local and imposed steering mechanisms, and 2) aligning the various steering 
mechanisms during the different phases of the disaster. We provide recommendations for 
alternative disaster governance mechanisms, as a way to strengthen future relief effort: 
coordination through interpretation, the use of narratives and reflective leadership. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 NWO project Enhancing smart disaster governance: Assessing the potential of the net-centric approach. See for a 
summary of the approach: Boersma, F.K., J. Ferguson, P. Groenewegen and J. Wolbers (2014). Beyond the Myth of 
Control: toward network switching in disaster management. In: Proceedings of the 11th International ISCRAM Conference 
– Penn State, S.R. Hiltz, M.S. Pfaff, L. Plotnick, and A.C. Robinson (eds). 
2 Drabek, T. E., & McEntire, D. A. (2002). Emergent phenomena and multiorganizational coordination in disasters: 
Lessons from the research literature. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 20(2): 197-224; Comfort, L. 
K., Dunn, M., Johnson, D., Skertich, R., & Zagorecki, A. (2004). Coordination in complex systems: increasing 
efficiency in disaster mitigation and response. International Journal of Emergency Management, 2(1-2): 62-80. 
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Picture 1. Impression of the damage. 
 
 
Picture 2. Organizational humanitarian response. 
 
 
  
Picture 3. Coordination efforts. 
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Background 
On Saturday the 25th of April 2015, Nepal was hit by a massive earthquake, measuring 7.8 on 
the Richter scale. This event was followed a mere 17 days later by another major earthquake, 
which came in as 7.3 on the scale. The epicentres of the two earthquakes and the number of 
casualties by district is shown in the picture below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 4. Source: http://data.unhcr.org/nepal/images/thumbnail.jpg 
A team of five academics went to Nepal four weeks later in order to carry out field-based 
research into the humanitarian response. Our specific research interests include coordination, 
information sharing, ICT and logistics. Our team consisted of people from the Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam (VU), the University of Tilburg and the University of Agder. 
This white paper is generated by the Smart Disaster Governance research team based at VU. The 
Smart Disaster Governance project is a NWO (Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research) 
project that is being conducted in close collaboration with partner organizations, including 
Oxfam-Novib and Cordaid. 
We carried out fieldwork consisting of on site research in Kathmandu and the Nuwakot and 
Rasuwa regions, in close collaboration with locally based agencies. 3  Fieldwork involved 
interviewing, observing and shadowing people involved in the response. We primarily spoke with 
people based at multilateral agencies and (I)NGOs. As such, this paper primarily reflects their 
perspectives. We complemented our field data with online sources (such as ACAPS and 
ALNAP). People based at the following organizations contributed their time to our research 
during our visit: 
 
• Multilateral agencies: UNOCHA; IOM; WFP. 
• Nepali branches of INGOs: Oxfam; Cordaid; IFRC; ICRC; World Vision; Handicap 
International; Islamic Relief; IsraAID; Transparency International; Finnish Evangelical 
Lutheran Mission; SOS Children’s Villages; Humedica. 
• Nepal based NGOs: Kathmandu Living Labs (KLL); United Mission to Nepal; Nepal 
Red Cross Society. 
• Local government: Nuwakot and Rasuwa District Administration Offices. 
 
                                                          
3 This research project conforms to the AAA Code of Ethics. This means that the information respondents provide 
is treated confidentially, is anonymized where appropriate, is not used for individual interest, and is presented 
accurately. 
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Top-down versus emergent coordination 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the disaster in Nepal, a number of formal coordination 
mechanisms were activated. Indeed, this is common practice when a major disaster strikes for 
which interactional assistance is requested. Given the importance of coordination at times of an 
emergency, the UN General Assembly has rolled out a formal system to facilitate this process, 
dating far back to 1991. This system is managed by the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). In addition to the UN system, other formal 
mechanisms exist in Nepal to facilitate coordination such as the NGO federation of Nepal, 
which has local branches or ‘chapters’, and which brings together both national and international 
NGOs working in the same geographical area. At the local level, government run District 
Disaster Response Committees also aim to enable coordination between the work of different 
humanitarian actors. 
Humanitarian organizations tend to identify and 
choose suitable partners to work with through the 
UNOCHA cluster system 4 – as well as through 
other established networks. If national authorities 
require assistance with the management of a large-
scale humanitarian response, UNOCHA activates 
a number of relevant groups or ‘clusters’, each 
focusing on a different top-level area of 
humanitarian importance, such as health and 
shelter. These clusters function as points of 
contact for different international humanitarian 
actors working in these fields. It also provides 
them with a clear physical – and also virtual – 
space to get together, learn about each other’s 
plans and activities and potentially partner or 
coordinate their activities. 
Picture 5. UNOCHA Cluster meeting in Kathmandu. 
                                                          
4 http://www.alnap.org/what-we-do/leadership-coordination 
Top-down coordination without a clearly defined common goal may lead to ‘coordination 
neglect’ and needless overhead.  
Coordination mechanisms enforced on NGOs without ‘translating’ objectives to the field may 
contribute to a situation whereby different partners only communicate about the division of labour, 
but fail to communicate how their outputs fit together into a coherent whole. In this way, 
coordination mechanisms take up precious time and resources, and thereby limit NGOs’ flexibility to 
form the most strategically useful partnerships in the moment. 
Next to the UNCOHA cluster system, however, various (new) governance structures have been 
put in place in Nepal. These are not always in line with or aligned to the cluster system, as we 
encountered for instance during a meeting of the Dutch Relief Alliance (DRA) in Kathmandu 
that we were invited to attend. The DRA, a coalition of twelve humanitarian organizations with 
links to the Netherlands, is a relatively new consortium, including Dutch NGOs and Dutch 
branches of international NGOs, and set up in April 2015, just before the first earthquake struck 
Nepal.5 The DRA demands coordination with a specific set of partners as a precondition for 
accessing funding from the Dutch government, and in that respect differs from other existing 
coordination mechanisms, which may demand coordination with the local government or local 
NGOs as a precondition for access. However, the DRA does provide INGOs with freedom and 
flexibility to choose with whom they wish to cooperate. 
The Dutch government provided the following rationale for the creation of this new 
coordination mechanism: 
Due to the piling up of crises the need for emergency relief is greater than ever. This means that all 
parties involved should cooperate better and that there should be no room for competition between 
organizations. This facility has been created to prioritize the victims of humanitarian disasters over 
organizational interests… 
Lilianne Ploumen, Minister for Development Cooperation and Foreign Trade 
This request made sense from the perspective of the Dutch government, which noted that it 
provided funding to a number of NGOs that were all working in the same geographical areas, 
and which all addressed the same or similar issues. Furthermore, following a number of high 
profile media scandals that plagued the Dutch NGO sector, the government was also faced with 
the need to address a growing scepticism and distrust among Dutch citizens about how their 
donations or tax euros were being spent. The creation of a formal coordination mechanism 
through which NGOs funded by the Dutch government had to work together seemed to 
address these points well. 
However, whilst the request for Dutch NGOs to coordinate as a consortium was appropriate for 
the Dutch context, our impression was that it made less sense in the context of post-earthquake 
Nepal, because its members were already working together – and with others – through other 
established coordination mechanisms. 
What more can you do in coordination when there are already coordination systems in place? ... We are 
all in different clusters, we are all coordinating side by side attending meetings. So the Dutch Relief 
Alliance should really add value… We need to link back to the DRA in the Netherlands in order to 
find out what, according to them, this added value is. 
Attendees at a DRA meeting in Kathmandu, 24.06.2015 
 
 
                                                          
5 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2015/08/01/beleidsdoorlichting-humanitaire-hulp-2009-
2014  
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We observed that coalition members in Nepal had to invest significant time and effort into 
interpreting and making sense of the DRA’s request. They proactively brainstormed ideas about 
how to create added value as a DRA and came up with useful ideas, such as peer monitoring and 
sharing success stories. Whilst this added value for NGOs as a way to learn from each other and 
build on each other’s strengths, their efforts to make sense of and implement the request ‘to 
coordinate’ also appeared to result in a lot of overhead; time that could have been spent on 
building ties and creating alliances that seemed most strategically useful and pertinent to the 
situation at hand. 
This example signposts a lack of communication between the Netherlands and Nepal, and a 
failure to establish clearly beforehand what coordinating ‘as a DRA’ should entail in a context 
where the relevant INGOs are already coordinating their work through other mechanisms. It 
also suggests coordination neglect between the DRA in the Netherlands and the DRA in Nepal – a 
term that refers to the situation whereby different partners work in different contexts 
communicate about the division of labour but fail to communicate how their outputs should fit 
together into a coherent whole. 6  A common problem in communication that can lead to 
coordination neglect, which we also found here, is the failure to ‘translate’ what is wanted in 
terms of coordination into language that makes sense to people with a different professional 
background and who are working in a different context. 
While final conclusions about the usefulness of DRA as a local coordination mechanism in the 
Nepal context are premature, it is worth asking whether it makes sense to ask Dutch – and only 
Dutch – NGOs to work together in an international setting that requires cooperation between a 
range of local, national and international actors. By demanding that Dutch NGOs spend their 
limited time and resources on finding ways to make cooperation with their compatriots 
meaningful, the Dutch government unintentionally reduced the impetus and space that Dutch 
NGOs needed to proactively build relationships with other INGOs, national organizations and 
local communities. This top-down imposed coordination with compatriots clearly did not stop 
members of the DRA from working with other partners through different mechanisms. 
However, it did constitute yet another pressure on the organizations’ time and resources and 
incentivized partnering on the basis of a shared foreign nationality, rather than on the basis of 
direct local involvement or strengthening local capacities. 
  
                                                          
6 This refers to the common situation whereby different actors work in different contexts, don’t communicate 
adequately and as a result produce outputs that don’t fit together into a coherent whole.  For a discussion of the 
topic see: Heath, C., & Staudenmayer, N. (2000). Coordination neglect: How lay theories of organizing complicate 
coordination in organizations. Research in Organizational Behavior, 22, 153-191. 
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Imposed versus optional cooperation 
 
Refugees and/or internally displaced people (IDPs) are often thought of as people fleeing from 
conflict and persecution. However, this perception is likely to change in the near future when 
more and more people are likely to become forcibly displaced as a result of the expected increase 
in the rate of natural disasters. 7 Prior to the 2015 earthquakes, Nepal already counted 50.000 
IDPs who had left their homes as a result of the armed conflict and 83.000 IDPs who had fled as 
a result of previous disasters. This problem was greatly exacerbated by the earthquakes in April 
and May 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 6. IDP camps present in Kathmandu 5 days after the first earthquake. (soruce: Harvard Humanitairian Initiative) 
Picture 6 above shows the number of IDP camps that emerged in Kathmandu in the immediate 
aftermath of the first earthquake. At present, environmentally displaced persons are not 
adequately covered by the international protection regimes that were set up for refugees and 
IDPs, like a IOM representative explained: “in the aftermath of a disaster little attention is being paid to 
the rights of these displaced people”. 
                                                          
7 It has been noted that urban informal settles in camps is a challenge for (and sometimes threat to) local 
governments. For example: http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2015/201506-global-urban-
informal-settlers.pdf  
Providing humanitarian aid to IDP camps may change the political landscape 
There is a strong humanitarian imperative to provide internally displaced people (IDPs) with aid. 
However, IDP camps may attract refugees from external districts. This is a politically sensitive issue 
in Nepal because the influence of different parties within the coalition government is based on the 
number of regions that each party controls. As such, the cross-district movement of large numbers 
of people with different political affiliations can significantly alter the political balance. 
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During our research mission to Nepal, we learned that district authorities and NGOs were both 
involved in attempts at managing and providing services for IDPs. From our discussions with 
humanitarian actors it became clear that, whilst their efforts to aid IDPs were intended to be 
apolitical, their actions had the opposite effect. The government of Nepal was naturally 
concerned about the emergence of IDP camps, in particular in Kathmandu. Not only were they 
worried that the camps might change into permanent settlements without facilities, they were 
also concerned about the political implications at the local and national levels. 
Given that a party’s political power in the coalition government is determined by the number of 
geographical areas it controls, the movement of large numbers of IDPs that ‘belong’ to a 
particular party into a new area can change regional political control – and thereby the amount of 
influence that parties have at the national level. By providing services to IDP camps, 
humanitarian agencies were thus unintentionally changing the political landscape: by helping 
people in need – without discriminating against them on the basis of political affiliation – they 
risked drawing in more refugees from areas that ‘belonged’ to other political parties, enabling the 
creation of long-term informal settlements. 
 
Picture 7. Temporal settlement in Kathmandu. 
Displacement is a phenomenon that is usually highly politicized. In fact, given that the rights of 
environmental IDPs are not explicitly addressed in international legal norms and institutional 
arrangements for dealing with forced displacement, these people are rendered all the more 
vulnerable. 
All governments hate camps. They fear camps, because they think camps, if they, they think all these 
NGOs will come here and start providing services and help to those people they will never go away and 
now I have this informal, what is now a temporary settlement will be become a permanent one without an 
infrastructure. It's the beginning of something that can be very complicated. The way we talk with 
government partners throughout the world - is the push and pull factor. 
IOM representative 
The decision to create – or tolerate – camps for internally displaced people (IDPs) is usually 
made for pragmatic reasons: people in need require assistance and the most efficient way of 
organizing this logistically is by ‘housing’ them all in one physical location. Nevertheless, the 
emergence of such camps is often a politically sensitive issue.  
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There is a real risk that camps – erected for temporary purposes – become semi-permanent 
installations. Furthermore, convening people from different backgrounds together in one camp 
can result in tensions. However, in Nepal the political implications extend well beyond this. 
The one thing that is also a problem here in Nepal - and I am sure you’ve heard - is that the political 
structure is quite weak because it is a coalition government. There haven't been elections. This means that 
each geographic unit, each VDC [village development committee] belongs to a party. If you move people 
from one place to another you are actually changing voting intentions. And that has a HUGE 
[emphasizes] political agenda that we definitely don't want to be involved with. So basically this, my 
village belongs to a certain party. If you come to my village we are increasing their power because it is 
about representation. Yeah, so there is no election, so right, it's not really about the bulletin. It's that 
geographical. 
IOM representative 
Thus, when communities of IDPs moved across district borders they upset the political balance 
in that region, signifying a clear political problem. Nevertheless, providing assistance to IDPs is a 
strong humanitarian imperative, given their vulnerability. For instance, we visited Nepal just 
before the monsoon season; the impending rains posed an enormous threat to the wellbeing of 
the displaced people living in camps. We learned that Cordaid, in consultation with the local 
authorities, had made the decision to provide aid to IDP camps in Rasuwa and Nuwakot 
districts. 
But look at the people who are living in the river belt. Those are the IDPs coming from the north. While 
going to Dhunche I have seen how much is the devastation in their villages. The lands are cracked, the 
mountains have fallen apart and the rivers are swollen. They can be isolated at any time. Fearing in the 
monsoon that the mountains may fall and kill them, they have decided to migrate to the riverbanks. We 
talked to the people, and there are a lot of problems actually, because these people of around 300 
households are living there. There are no sanitation facilities, there are no toilets, and there is no drinking 
water. The situation is very filthy and the monsoon is coming next. There may be Cholera if the water is 
not cleaned. 
Cordaid representative 
Furthermore, IDP camps present an opportunity to (I)NGOs to channel aid and recovery 
assistance toward people who are among the most vulnerable in society. This is because people 
who have the means to seek shelter elsewhere generally do not choose to enter or remain in such 
camps. Thus, generally speaking only those who lack the assets and social networks that would 
enable them to set up a (temporary) life elsewhere tend to remain in such camps. As such, a 
deliberate targeting of these camps by (I)NGOs would enable them to reach the poorest and 
most marginalized households in a country.8  
                                                          
8 Anderson, M. B., & Woodrow, P. J. (1998). Rising from the ashes: development strategies in times of disaster. Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Boulder London. 
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Seeking a balance between local and imposed steering mechanisms 
In order to govern the tension between local and imposed steering mechanisms humanitarian 
agencies cooperate closely with local official and emergent political structures, such as local 
authorities and (in)formal community leaders. The problem is that these local government 
officials and emergent leaders are generally stretched to the limit in their efforts to respond to 
the crisis at hand and, as such, lack the capacity to critically examine their actions and decisions 
for bias and blind spots. 
[The monitoring officer] was in the field, she was in fact checking the beneficiary list [provided by the Village 
Development Committee] on ethnicity and she said that some people are missing here. Then she started to 
ask where are these people? Oh no, they are living there. Ah, and then she went over. And she asked people 
around there, “is this distribution ongoing?” and the people [the untouchables] were not even aware. So this 
traditional communication system does not always work perfectly. It’s the automatic exclusion mechanism. 
“Oh”, they said. Excluded by default. 
Oxfam representative 
Nepal is currently ranked 145 on the Human Development Index9, which is a clear indication 
that its government has limited financial and technical capabilities. A disaster of the magnitude 
recently faced by Nepal thus puts tremendous pressure on already strained local and national 
government bodies. Local authorities faced the challenge of ensuring that all affected families 
registered in their district received their fair share of aid. 
 
Picture 8. Inhabitants of the Nuwakot valley lining up for registration. 
                                                          
9 http://hdr.undp.org/en/data 
Groups that are absent from official registers may also get excluded from relief programs 
Vulnerable communities may never have formally registered their existence with local government 
bodies and, as such, be absent from official records. As a result, those most in need may not be 
present on the lists of potential beneficiaries that local governments provide to NGOs for the 
distribution of relief goods. Local authorities often don’t notice – or prioritize – this issue because 
their capacity to respond to the crisis is already stretched to the limit. 
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One problem local government faced in this context was that a significant number of families 
attempted to ‘game the system’ in order to access more assistance than they were strictly entitled 
to. Given that aid was generally distributed per household, after the earthquake a significant 
proportion of households claimed to be multiple smaller households so as to receive the same 
allowance multiple times. 
Yeah, the whole district there is divided into many sections. We call them VDCs - Village Development 
Committees. So we got permission from seven VDCs and we worked through four partners and that was 
about...in the beginning it was about 7,000 households and then it increased up to 9,000 households and 
by the time we are done it’s more than 10,000 households…. It kept increasing... 
Representative United Mission to Nepal 
Furthermore, some people who had moved away from their district of origin decades ago and 
settled somewhere else returned ‘home’ in order to claim assistance there – even if their current 
house and livelihood had not been badly affected. Faced with such attempts at fraud, some local 
district officials sought to closely manage and control the distribution of aid by (I)NGOs, 
insisting that only registered households who could present identity cards be included in lists of 
potential beneficiaries. However, because vulnerable households – those most in need – are 
frequently absent from official government records, this approach posed quite a problem. 
The system that has been put in place I feel is quite wrong because of registration. So, the list is generated by 
the [Village Development Committee’s] secretary and they present it to the NGOs and then the NGOs uses 
that as the basis for distribution. But we have tried to move a step ahead and verify the list, I mean, and say, 
“okay, out of this general list you’ve presented, who are the most vulnerable, who, where are they,” - trying to 
factor in the inclusion, the general inclusion of everybody into the system. And it always proves to become 
quite a challenge to do such a hard talk because, “no no no we cannot allow you to do this. We need to do it 
our way or there’s always going to be push back.” So, there’s always a bit of a fight to make sure all this 
happens right. 
Oxfam representative 
The example illustrates how local organizational structures – and the formal records they create – 
tend to embody or even reinforce local socio-economic inequalities and exclusions. Indeed, some 
households and communities had never formally registered their existence, and local government 
bodies – stretched to the limit by their effort to respond to the crisis – did not prioritize or even 
notice their absence from the official lists used to distribute aid. This clearly constituted a major 
blind spot and was a problem for NGOs that wanted to aid those who were most vulnerable. 
Yeah, and then the overall aspect of, like, from a humanitarian point of view, I would say that there’s a 
problem that has to be addressed but then the authorities wouldn’t see it as a problem. So like, for instance, 
the exclusion of those people, based on the social construct, that’s a problem for me because these are really 
vulnerable people and the people don’t see it as a problem. 
Oxfam representative 
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This issue is sometimes addressed by complementing the data contained in official lists and 
registers with information provided directly by communities. In the aftermath of a disaster, many 
actors emerge to play a vital role in their community by providing advice, comfort and 
information on the community’s needs. These emergent leaders may take on the role of focal 
points for humanitarian organizations, acting as information conduits and managing the relief 
efforts at the micro-level. 
However, local communities are diverse and subject to change. As such, it is important to note 
that emergent leadership can also reflect local socio-economic inequalities and exclusions. 
Emergent local leaders may not represent – or have knowledge of – the needs and circumstances 
of all groups that live in ‘their’ area.  
In addition, the work carried out by (I)NGOs in areas struck by disaster may not only reflect the 
local biases of the local power structures through which they operate, but also the priorities of 
their institutional and private donors.10 At times of crisis these priorities are – at least in part – 
shaped by the focus of the international media. When this happens (I)NGOs find themselves 
under tremendous pressure to show and be seen how they are responding to the crisis. We noted 
that in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake in Nepal, the attention of the media was 
focused primarily on the Kathmandu Valley areas. Indeed, at the time of our research visit, four 
weeks after the second earthquake, we found that most aid and assistance had been targeted at 
this area – even though the rural areas adjacent to the Kathmandu valley had been affected far 
worse.11 In fact: some of the worst hit villages had not yet received much assistance at all.  
Our fieldwork experiences indicate that while governing the tension between local and imposed 
steering mechanisms, it is important to address both the resilience and vulnerabilities in these 
remote local communities. Collaborating with local communities is necessary for developing 
insight into their needs, but at the same time this approach risks replicating the local power 
imbalances and inequalities that are present in the community itself. Thus, in order to provide 
inclusive relief to these communities, recognizing and acting on both local resilience and 
vulnerabilities is a crucial step for governing the tension between local and imposed steering 
mechanisms.  
                                                          
10 Koch, D. J., Dreher, A., Nunnenkamp, P., & Thiele, R. (2009). Keeping a low profile: what determines the 
allocation of aid by non-governmental organizations?. World development, 37(5), 902-918. 
11https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/assessments/150515_nepal_
situation_analysis_osocc_assessmente_cell_-_final_final.pdf 
8 
 
Influencing the phase of disaster governance 
During our visit to Nepal, we found that one of the most pressing governance dilemmas in the 
earthquake response – that affected the humanitarian community as a whole – was triggered by 
the government decision to move from the response phase to the recovery phase. A disaster 
response is often divided into four different phases: preparedness, response, recovery, and 
mitigation. These phases signal what responders tend to focus on in their relief efforts. The 
government had purposefully used its power to frame the legal and policy context and restrict 
what humanitarian agencies could do in an attempt to gain the lead in the humanitarian response 
efforts. The government justified its decision on the basis of a well-established narrative about 
the resilience of local communities in Nepal, expressing a concern about people becoming reliant 
on aid. Talking with representatives from a number of INGOs and intergovernmental 
organizations, (including the WFP, Oxfam, Cordaid and UNOCHA) we found that this decision 
had a clear and direct effect on the on-going response operations. 
While seemingly neutral, the decision to move from one phase to the next signals a new disaster 
policy landscape in which different priorities are set and support is given. In the aftermath of the 
earthquakes in Nepal, the humanitarian response focused initially on search and rescue and 
subsequently on the distribution of relief materials, prioritizing the provisioning of shelter, food 
and safe water, amongst other things, to the affected communities. 
However, after about one month the government took the decision to move into the recovery 
phase. This decision was taken in part to regain sovereign control over important socio-
economic developments that were taking place in the country. The government had previously 
requested that all aid gifted to the country be channelled into a Prime Minister’s Relief Fund so 
as to be able to manage these resources and ensure that they were used to support – and not to 
counter – Nepal’s national relief and development priorities. It also tried to regulate the (new) 
responding NGOs by implementing registration system. 
However, international humanitarian organizations are accountable to their own donors and as 
such need to control their funds. Therefore, they could not have complied with this request even 
if they had been strongly motivated to do so. 
Now the government has declared that the emergency response is over and we should get into 
redevelopment as of last Monday. So what they are doing is try to pull back the military forces they have 
put into the country, back to their normal day jobs. By the middle of July, in the next two weeks, it 
should be business as usual as much as possible. 
UNOCHA representative 
A national government may use its legal powers to shift the focus of humanitarian assistance 
Two months after the second earthquake, the government of Nepal decided to formally change the 
phase of the humanitarian response from ‘relief’ to ‘recovery’. As part of this move, they ended the 
duty free period for humanitarian goods. This greatly influenced what and how much NGOs could 
import and therefore what they could do in their efforts to respond to the crisis. 
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We respond to an appeal of the government, and that means that the government needs to be in the loop. 
Quite soon the government came and showed that they have that responsibility for the population and they 
want to take up that responsibility. The way that they wanted to do it was of course the question, because 
they created this Prime Minister’s Relief Fund. They were hoping that all the donors would put their money 
there and they would do all the operations. And that did not work out because that is not how it always 
works in the emergency relief context. It's many organizations that use own funds. 
Oxfam representative 
When the government officially announced the end of the relief phase it also ended the duty-free 
period for a specified list of humanitarian goods. Their reasoning was that corporations and 
humanitarian organizations misused the duty-free status of humanitarian relief materials. The 
Nepalese phone company Ncell, for example, was found guilty of importing telecom equipment 
from China in boxes stamped with the Red Cross logo, evading Rs10.1 million (€82.500) in tax 
payment. The company later acknowledged its dues and paid the outstanding import duty in 
full.12 
Initially there was nothing, everything was allowed to clear. But later on some elements did misuse of relief 
materials. In the name of relief materials they started importing so many other things what is not required for 
the relief, but may be required for their organization, but that is not the requirement of the relief. When such a 
thing the government started to collect import on a lot of things, and after that it became very, very difficult. You 
know, most of the agencies had brought genuine things, but they were also restricted because of a couple of 
organizations who did try to misuse this privilege. The initial month there was not much problem, but after 
that, after the first month the second month become very, very challenging for me. 
Representative World Food Programme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 9. Relief products remaining to be claimed at the Kathmandu airport customs. 
                                                          
12 http://www.npnewsportal.com/ncell-import-with-red-cross-stamps/ 
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At the time the government announced the official shift from the relief to the recovery phase, 
some remote communities had not yet received much aid or assistance to help them prepare for 
the imminent monsoons. The reinstatement of taxes on relief goods constituted a major obstacle 
to humanitarian organizations. It undermined the speed and effectiveness of humanitarian actors 
and thus significantly slowed down the ongoing response operations. This was especially 
troublesome as the recent earthquakes in Nepal had had their greatest impact in remote rural 
areas, not in the relatively easy to reach area of the Kathmandu valley. Reaching these remote 
communities constituted one of the greatest logistical challenges. 
Customs is probably the number one challenge of the humanitarian community at the moment. Because of the 
taxes and the delays at the borders and the airport of getting goods in but also having to pay duty and import 
duty of humanitarian goods, which should be free of that. So that is a big challenge. There have been 
countless meetings with government agencies to try to get that resolved. … Although the government is saying 
the response is over the humanitarian community is very, very worried that the needs have not been met. There 
is a big need out there for shelter and a lot of other things. Many people haven't got anything yet, because they 
are so remote. 
UNOCHA representative 
The government further justified its decision to change the formal phase of the response – and 
end the duty-free period for humanitarian goods – on the basis of a well-established narrative 
about the resilience of local communities in Nepal. The government expressed the concern that 
Nepal’s highly resilient communities might become ‘corrupted’ by external aid, might lose their 
self-reliance and become dependent on external assistance. To harness the resilience of local 
communities, the government’s message for the people of Nepal was hence to go revert to their 
normal lives again. 
The government is very conscious about trying to get back to business as usual and have the rebuilding start. 
What they are saying is that they don't want people to become dependent on aid, which is a valid point. So 
they want the people that are in tent cities here to go back to their region, and have shelter there and get back 
to farming and back to being self-sufficient. They want to avoid reliance on aid. Also they don't want the 
marketplace flooded with a lot of imported material. They want to local economy and markets to ramp up to 
meet the demand of the locals. 
UNOCHA representative 
When we visited Nepal we saw clear signs of resilience in both the urban area of Kathmandu as 
well as the more remote areas of Rasuwa and Nuwakot. For example, we saw that in some 
remote villages in Rasuwa people had not waited for external aid to arrive but had instead started 
to rebuild their houses and construct temporary shelters using materials scavenged from 
collapsed structures and corrugated galvanized iron (CGI) sheets from earlier humanitarian 
operations in the area. From our informal conversations with the local people there we learned 
that frequent floods and landslides had taught people to rely on their own ingenuity and skills 
when faced with very challenging circumstances. 
 
11 
 
The people do not sit idle in those places. They indeed can no longer wait for the agencies to come and bring 
the CGI sheets. So whichever, timber or CGI, they will use it. They already made a temporary shelter, which 
is fine for us. So in that case the government is also encouraging them to make the houses. That is fine. 
Cordaid representative 
Be this as it may, resilience does not mean that communities can handle any and all levels of 
adversity life throws their way. As resilient as people are, there is a point at which basic assistance 
can make the difference between coping with the aftermath of a disaster and not being able to 
pull through. 
Very soon we start talking about long term. Sometimes too soon, because now the government said: relief 
is over, it is now all about reconstruction. That has a huge implication. For instance, they are not 
allowing the importation of goods that are relief goods, because we are not in relief phase any more. 
Although we know that coverage has not been 100%. People are going back. The monsoon is coming; 
they need waterproof support. They are extremely resilient, but that minimum input that needs to be there. 
The winter is coming. So it is that sequence, the calendar, and the weather. It is just very complicated. In 
any, any country you never see housing reconstruction start earlier than one year after the disaster. 
IOM representative 
The end of the duty-free period for humanitarian goods limited what humanitarian agencies 
could import and distribute on the ground. As such, this government decision limited 
organizations’ options in terms of aid provision. At the time the government announced this 
formal shift, many badly hit remote communities had not yet received any assistance at all even 
though they faced the imminent threat of the monsoon rains. The reinstatement of import tax 
on relief items significantly restricted how much – and how quickly – the humanitarian 
community could act in order to address these needs. As such, the distribution of aid did not 
reflect the degree of suffering on the ground, but rather the combined impact of space and time: 
the geography of the country and a major policy change. Therefore, shifting the formal phase of 
the relief operation had a great influence on the capacity of the humanitarian relief organizations 
to address the vulnerabilities, and support the resilience of the affected communities. 
 
   
Picture 10. Resilient people and communities .  
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Conclusion and Discussion 
In this paper we looked at the dilemmas of coordination (i.e. the synchronization of actions) and 
cooperation (i.e. the working together) between the various responding organizations, 
governmental bodies and local communities in Nepal, and how these organizations coped with 
the dilemmas. Coordination appeared to be difficult because of the heterogeneity of the 
responding organizations and the complexity of the local governmental structures. At the same 
time, incoming responding organizations had to coordinate their actions and collaborate with 
other organizations and local communities. 
The first dilemma we faced had to do with top-down versus emergent coordination. The humanitarian 
response organizations in Nepal had to find a balance between established coordination 
mechanisms implemented by UNOCHA, imposed collaboration efforts between various NGOs 
and local, emergent response initiatives. An example we reported on in this paper is coordination 
mechanism implemented via the Dutch Relief Alliance, a coalition of twelve humanitarian 
organizations with links to the Netherlands. While stimulating organizations to develop a joint 
response strategy to disasters through the DRA was an appropriate coordination mechanism 
within the Dutch context, this was not necessarily the case in the field. Drawing conclusions 
about the usefulness of DRA as local coordination mechanism is premature, given its recent 
establishment; however, it is worth critically considering whether it makes sense to ask Dutch 
NGOs to work together in an international setting – and if so, how this could be achieved. 
The second dilemma we faced was imposed versus optional cooperation. Responding organizations had 
to work with local (governmental) organizations and communities, but were faced with the 
problem that local government officials and emergent leaders were stretched to the limit in their 
capacity to respond to the crisis. Besides, these local actors were also motivated by their own 
political agendas. In this paper we provide the example of providing aid to Internally Displaced 
People (IDP) camps. IDP camps are a politically sensitive issue at times of disasters and in this 
regard Nepal is no exception. The collaborating response organizations had to find a balance 
between providing aid to IDP camps and accommodating the interests of local politicians, given 
that aid to IDP camps could alter the geographical representation of political parties and their 
political influence within the coalition government. 
We found that, given the dynamic nature of the crisis setting in Nepal, relief organizations were 
in constant need to improvise coordination and cooperation in order to deal with new and 
unexpected circumstances thus reinventing coordination and cooperation mechanisms in action. 
They acted in the spirit of a slogan we saw on the wall in one of the logistical centres: “When 
nothing goes right, go left, and everything matters”. 
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Picture 11: lessons learned at the Logistics Department of the WFP, Kathmandu 
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Recommendations 
Donor-imposed coordination mechanisms need to add value in a humanitarian crisis context. In 
order for the mechanism to be effective, it is essential that the coordination aims are 
communicated unequivocally, and also make sense in the context in which the partner NGOs 
operate. This requires regular contact and the ‘translation’ of information by all parties into terms 
that make sense to people who operate in a different environment and have different expertise. 
This work could be undertaken by staff who are familiar with not just their own context and 
professional background, but that of the donor and/or other partners as well, who can act as 
‘interpreters’. Moreover, regular communication can reduce the risk of coordination failure and 
limit unnecessary overhead, thereby availing time and resources for NGOs to invest in the 
strategically most useful coordination efforts, and including organizations not necessarily part of 
the donor imposed mechanism. 
 
 
During the response to the earthquake in Nepal, we encountered different stories about the 
nature of the ongoing humanitarian operations. Many positive stories emerged about the 
organization of the relief work, while more critical stories illustrated the challenges that NGOs 
and government bodies faced. These stories were not neutral and were selectively used to 
legitimize the different strategies of key actors. For instance, the government decision to move 
from response to recovery phase, ending the duty-free period for humanitarian goods, was based 
on the dominant narrative of local resilience and the risk of the population becoming dependent 
on aid. Although there is certain value in this perspective, the timing of the decision undermined 
the ongoing relief work undertaken by humanitarian organizations. When we visited Nepal, the 
view that many people still required aid was primarily voiced within the humanitarian 
community. Before the government made its decision, little had been done to publicly challenge 
the dominant narrative that the government used to justify its choice. 
Humanitarian agencies in Nepal might have been able to delay the government’s decision if they 
had proactively countered the narrative the government used to legitimize this choice. As such, 
the monitoring of national and local media for potentially harmful narratives – and the proactive 
countering of such narratives – should be a priority of nationally based communications staff.  
  
Narratives: actively monitor – and counter – dominant narratives that could be used to 
justify policy decisions that undermine the humanitarian response 
Coordination: when introducing a new coordination mechanism into a humanitarian 
context where several already exist – ensure that all parties are clear on its intended 
added value. 
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Humanitarian organizations often (have to) work through local political structures, such as local 
government bodies or (emergent) community leaders. Given that these structures tend to 
embody local socio-economic inequalities and exclusions, the relief efforts carried out by these 
humanitarian agencies may end up reflecting local biases and blind spots. Groups that are absent 
from official registers may also get excluded from relief and recovery programs. In order to 
address this issue NGOs sometimes try to complement official data with data directly obtained 
from the affected communities. To this end, they often turn to (emergent) community leaders 
and use them as focal points. Whilst both official data and information provided by these leaders 
may reflect biases and blind spots, having two distinct sources of information enables 
triangulation (to some extent). 
In order to optimize this approach and ensure that vulnerable individuals unintendedly are not 
neglected, it is key to verify the scope of (emergent) community leaders’ networks so as to be 
clear about who are represented by these individuals and who are not – and to identify other 
(emergent) leaders that represent subgroups within a community that are not linked to the focal 
points the organization already works with. 
 
Future Research 
 
During the next three years, the NWO “Smart Disaster Governance” Research Team at VU 
Amsterdam will continue our research into humanitarian crisis management in close 
collaboration with our consortium partners. We will examine the challenges humanitarian 
responders face in their efforts to foster societal resilience and respond to major crises by 
specifically looking at issues related to coordination, cooperation and information sharing 
between different actors in humanitarian disaster settings. Our aim is to assess the potential of a 
bottom-up humanitarian response, in which emergent grassroots community networks play a 
central role, and how they are related to formal command and control practices and international 
coordination mechanisms such as the UNOCHA cluster system and the DRA. Our focus, then, 
will be on the (potential) role of physical – and virtual – community networks in the 
coordination of relief and recovery efforts, looking specifically at their (potential) role in the 
creation and sharing of local crisis information. 
In this NWO project, we will combine qualitative research (e.g. interviews, shadowing, 
observations) with social media analytics as well as social network analysis. We are currently 
planning a follow-up research field trip to Nepal in the spring of 2016 in order to expand our 
data set on the response to the 2015 earthquakes.  
Reflective leadership: work directly with emergent community leaders – but check who 
they represent 
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Acronyms 
 
ACAPS: Assessment Capacities Project 
ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance 
CGI: Corrugated Galvanized Iron 
DRA: Dutch Relief Alliance 
IDP: Internally Displaced Person 
ICT: Information and Communication Technology 
IOM: International Organization for Migration 
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization 
NGHA: Non-Governmental Humanitarian Agency 
NWO: Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research 
UN(OCHA): United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs   
UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund 
UMN: United Mission to Nepal 
KLL: Kathmandu Living Labs 
VDC: Village Development Committee 
WFP: World Food Programme 
  
17 
 
About the Research Team 
 
Fieldwork was carried out by: 
- Dr. ir. Kees Boersma, coordinator NWO project (f.k.boersma@vu.nl), Dr. Jeroen 
Wolbers (j.j.wolbers@vu.nl), Femke Mulder, MSc. (f.mulder@vu.nl). These researchers 
are based at VU University Amsterdam and contribute to the project “Enhancing Smart 
Disaster Governance” (2015-2018), which is funded by the Netherlands Organization for 
Scientific Research (NWO).13 
- Kenny Meesters, MSc, researcher in Information Management at Tilburg University, 
ICT developer and consultant for Cordaid (k.meesters@tilburguniversity.edu). His 
research focuses on the inclusion of locally generated information in the decision making 
process at formal organizations and on how ICTs can be used to empower local 
communities. 
- Hossein Baharmand, MSc, PhD research fellow at the University of Agder, Centre for 
Integrated Emergency Management (hossein.baharmand@uia.no). His research focuses 
on humanitarian logistics and distribution plan models. 
Long-distance research support during fieldwork was provided by: 
- Dr. Julie Ferguson, prof. dr. Peter Groenewegen and prof. dr. Bartel van de Walle, 
members (co-applicants) of the NWO Smart Disaster Governance project. They have 
been involved in the design of the project and in preparing the fieldwork trip to Nepal. 
 
Disclaimers 
This is a White Paper to inform a broader audience about the complex coordination and 
governance issues during the early response phase after the earthquakes in Nepal, in April/May 
2015. This paper is work-in-progress and part of the outcomes of a larger research project into 
disaster governance – and in particular the disaster response in Nepal. In this paper we provide a 
first impression of the kind of data we collected, and only draw temporal conclusions. 
Pictures are taken by the authors, except for the maps. 
The authors hold the copyrights of this paper. 
Respondents’ names are anonymized. 
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